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Abstract: 
The 1961 UN-organised Plebiscite provoked serious ethnic tension, bitterness and calls 
from some quarters for the partition of the British Southern Cameroons. The ethnic 
groups that voted for independence with Nigeria were not satisfied with the results of 
the plebiscite and were not ready to join the Republic of Cameroon. They clamoured for 
the partition of the British Southern Cameroons following the voting patterns so that 
those who voted for Nigeria could join Nigeria freely. This article based on archival and 
secondary sources attempts a survey of the crisis, the requests by the defeated ethnic 
groups for the partition of the British Southern Cameroons and the response of the 
Yaoundé authorities and the United Nations. The study argues that the requests for the 
partition of the Southern Cameroons were made out of fear that the reunified 
Cameroon could lead to the domination and exploitation of the coastal ethnic groups by 
the more dynamic and land grabbing ethnic groups of the Bamenda Grassfields and not 
out of some phobia for the French Cameroonians. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In July 1884, Germany annexed the coast of Cameroon and eventually occupied the 
hinterland. The Cameroon created by the Germans was inhabited by a multitude of 
ethnic groups. It was one of the most pluralistic colonies in terms of indigenous African 
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societies with more than 250 ethnic groups as identified by anthropologists and 
linguists. Like elsewhere in African, these ethnic groups maintained their distinctive 
characteristics during the colonial period and after. 
 Following the outbreak of the First World War in Europe in 1914, Britain, France 
and Belgium invaded German Cameroon and by February 1916, the Germans were 
defeated. The defeat of Germany was followed by the Anglo-French partition of 
Cameroon. France took control of four-fifths and Britain the remaining one-fifth of 
Cameroon. These powers were to administer their respective portions as Mandate B 
territories of the League of Nations. In 1922, the British decided to repartition British 
Cameroons into two; British Northern Cameroons and British Southern Cameroons. 
British Northern Cameroons was administered from Northern Nigeria and the 
Southern Cameroons, our area of study, was attached to Southern Nigeria in 1922 for 
"administrative convenience" (Nfi,2014:37). In 1946, and following constitutional 
reforms in Nigeria, the British Southern Cameroons became an integral part of the 
Eastern Region of Nigeria. The partition of Cameroon and the British decision to 
administer the Southern Cameroons as an integral part of Nigeria laid the foundation 
for the division that characterised the nationalists in Southern Cameroons after the 
Second World War. The German colonial rule had linked them to French Cameroon and 
from 1922, the British mandate and trusteeship over the Southern Cameroons linked 
them to Nigeria  
 By 1955, the political forces in the British Southern Cameroons, a UN Trust 
Territory since 1946, were radically divided over the future of the territory. Essentially, 
the Kamerun People’s Party (KPP) led by Nerius Namaso Mbile and the Kamerun 
National Congress (KNC) led by Emmanuel Mbella Liffafe Endeley wanted the British 
Southern Cameroon to gain independence as part of the Federation of Nigeria. The 
Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) led by Roland Moumie and its offshoot, One 
Kamerun (OK), led by Ndeh Ntumazah wanted independence for the British Southern 
Cameroon through reunification with the French controlled territory (French 
Cameroon). The Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) led by John Ngu Foncha, 
advocated a separate Southern Cameroon state and eventual reunification with French 
Cameroon (Chem-Langhëë, 1976:231; Le Vine, 1964:199-210). With this division and the 
ethnic character of the parties, subsequent elections became opportunities for ethnic 
groups to identify with the ideologies or leaders of these parties 
 
2. Origin of the Division and Ethnic Tension  
 
The Southern Cameroons had a total surface area of 16,581 square miles and a 
population of 445,735 in 1938 (Ngoh, 2001:23). It was inhabited by Bantu-speaking 
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peoples but divided by ethnic, linguistic, cultural and political differences. While the 
coastal people were organised in decentralised communities, the interior Grassfields 
people had centralised political institutions. The British reinforced these differences by 
dividing the territory first into four divisions; Victoria, Kumba, Mamfe and Bamenda. 
Later in 1949, the Bamenda Division was divided into three; Bamenda, Wum and 
Nkambe Divisions. These divisions made up the Bamenda Province or the Bamenda 
Grassfields while the Victoria, Kumba and Mamfe Divisions constituted the Cameroons 
Province, all of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. There existed cultural and historical 
differences between the Bakweri, Balondo, Bakundu, Bafaw and Bayang of the 
Cameroons Province at the coast or the Bantu proper and the Bali, Bafut, Nso, Kom and 
Mankon or the semi-Bantu of the Bamenda Province or the Bamenda Grassfields. A 
cultural, historical and administrative divide therefore already existed between the two 
zones of the Southern Cameroons before the politics of the plebiscite. Political parties 
inherited these cultural and political differences and some political parties were even 
identified with some ethnic groups. 
 The division and differences between the ethnic groups or the two zones and 
political parties were accentuated by elections especially the 1957 and 1959 legislative 
elections. In 1957, the ruling KNC won six seats in the Southern Cameroons House of 
Assembly (SCHA). The opposition KNDP and KPP won five and two seats respectively. 
The UPC that could not win a single seat, accused Endeley of rigging the elections and 
the UPC was outlawed by the British authorities on May 6, 1957 (Le Vine, 1964:206; Nfi, 
2014:221). The results of these elections indicated that the ruling KNC was threatened 
by the newly created and Grassfields dominated KNDP. The 1959 legislative elections 
also revealed that the parties and ethnic groups were divided over the future of the 
territory. The KPP and KNC that campaigned for union with Nigeria won a total of 
twelve seats in the SCHA while the OK and KNDP that wanted reunification with 
French administered Cameroon had a total of fourteen seats. The victory of the 
reunificationists over the integrationists was so narrow that independence to the 
Southern Cameroons could not be granted on the bases of the results of the 1959 
elections. Worse-still in March 1960, J N Boja, a KNDP reunificationist and deputy from 
the Grassfields constituency of Wum Division crossed the carpet and joined the KNC 
and integrationists. The SCHA was therefore divided into two equal camps, thirteen 
reunificationists and thirteen integrationists (Ngoh, 1987:233). 
 With this division, the UN had to organise a plebiscite in the territory for the 
indigenes to determine the future of their motherland. This plebiscite was organised on 
February 11, 1961 with the following questions; 
 Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria? 
 or 
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 Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroon? 
 The KNDP of John Ngu Foncha and the OK of Ndeh Ntumazah, all from the 
Bamenda Grassfields campaigned for reunification and 233,571 Cameroonians voted for 
reunification (Rubin, 1971: 199). The Cameroon Peoples National Convention (CPNC) - 
a KPP-KNC alliance led by Dr E M L Endeley and N N Mbile, all from the coastal zone 
campaigned for independence with Nigeria and only 97,571 voters opted for union with 
Nigeria (Ebune, 1992: 229). The plebiscite results were therefore in favour of the 
reunification of the two Cameroons. The CPNC and the coastal Bakweri, Bakossi, 
Bassosi, Balondo, Bafaw, Bakundu ethnic groups refused to accept the results and called 
on the UN to partition the Southern Cameroons. Even before the Plebiscite was 
organised, and following the continued divergence of views between Foncha and 
Endeley; N.N. Mbile had suggested that the way out of the dilemma was to partition 
the territory to allow each tribe or division make its own choice between the two 
alternatives. The calls for the partition of the territory were followed by threats of war 
and the intimidation of the Grassfields ethnic groups that massively voted for 
reunification. 
   
3. Plebiscite Campaigns and Ethnic Tension 
 
As mentioned above, the post plebiscite ethnic tension in the Southern Cameroons had 
its roots in the alleged ethnic composition of political parties, the antagonisms that 
characterised the campaigns and the voting patterns in the various divisions or 
constituencies. The KNDP which led the pro-reunification camp was considered as a 
Grassfields party probably because its main leaders (John Ngu Foncha, Solomon 
Tandeng Muna, Augustine Ngum Jua) were from Nkwen, Metta and Kom respectively 
in the Grassfields. The CPNC on the other hand was considered a coastal or forest zone 
party probably because its leaders such as E M L Endeley, N N Mbile, Motomby-Woleta 
and R N Charley were from the ethnic groups of the coast. The Bakweri, Bakossi, 
Bassosi, Balondo and Bakundu ethnic groups along the coast, saw the CPNC as the 
party that could protect their interest against Grassfields settlers who were considered 
as land grabbers (Chem-Langhëë, 233). The ethnic colouration of these parties 
influenced the campaign declarations. 
 During the plebiscite campaigns, the CPNC indicated that it was ready to fight 
against reunification even if the majority Southern Cameroonians voted for it. For 
example Endeley and the CPNC started the campaigns with this statement: 
 
 In the event of a vote in favour of the Cameroon Republic, the CPNC will request 
 unconditionally that the UN partition the territory between the group of persons desiring 
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 a union with the independent federation and those seeking a union with the Cameroon 
 Republic.  
(Chem-Langhëë, 272) 
 
 Apart from this statement, the CPNC also produced a campaign poster on which 
was a UN soldier splitting Cameroon with a machete. "Southern Cameroons to be split", 
read the poster "..this will happen if you vote foolishly at the plebiscite, choose English 
(Nigeria) refuse French (Cameroon Republic)" (Ebune, 184). Endeley's declarations and the 
poster were already indicators that the aftermath of the plebiscite could be chaotic in 
case the majority voted for reunification.  
 On the other hand, Foncha played on ethnic and regional sentiments to discredit 
union with Nigeria. On several occasions and in the constituencies of the Bamenda 
Grassfields, he presented the plebiscite alternatives as follows; Do you like Dr Endeley, 
the Bakweri man? Or Do you like Foncha, the Bamenda man? (Ngoh, 1987:233) By 
putting the plebiscite alternatives as being between "the Bakweri man" and "the 
Bamenda man" Foncha wanted to benefit from the fact that the Bamenda Grassfields 
was more populated than the forest zone with close to 52 percent of the population of 
the Southern Cameroons. Unfortunately, Foncha's declarations raised fears amongst the 
coastal people that a reunified Cameroon could become what Mbile called the "Bamita 
Empire", that is, a new republic dominated by the Meta ethnic group and the 
Grassfields people in general.  
 The plebiscite results confirmed Endeley's fears. Out of the total of 233,571 votes 
in favour of reunification, 150,622 came from the Bamenda Grassfields with the 
Bamenda Division alone having 108,485 votes (Fanso, 1991:154). The overwhelming 
vote for reunification in the Bamenda Division in particular could be explained by the 
presence of two leading reunificationists Foncha and Ntumazah. Generally, while the 
Grassfields voted for reunification, the coastal indigenes especially the Bakweri, 
Bakossi, Balondo, Bakundo and Bassosi voted against.  
 In Kumba Division, the indigenous people led by Hon. Francis Ajebe-Sone, N N 
Mbile, J N Nasako, R N Charley and R N Ntoko voted for union with Nigeria. In the 
Kumba north-east, Kumba south-east and Kumba south-west constituencies where the 
majority voted for reunification, it was realised that the Grassfields settlers from 
Bamenda and the Bamileke region of French Cameroon were those who inflated the 
votes in favour of reunification. Despite their pro-reunification votes, Kumba Division 
generally rejected reunification by 32,733 votes for Nigeria and 27,600 votes for 
Cameroon (Ebune, 230). 
 In the Victoria Division, home of Endeley and Motomby-Woleta, the Bakweri, 
Bomboko, Wovea, Bimbia, Bakolle, Balong, Efik and Mungo people (indigenes), rejected 
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reunification by voting for Nigeria. After the plebiscite, the Bakweri themselves made a 
very careful study of the voting pattern in their villages and it revealed that fifteen 
villages predominantly inhabited by the Bakweri had 6,546 voters and only 840 voted 
for Cameroon. The rest 5,706 voted for Nigeria. These Bakweri votes were as follows: 
 
Bakweri Villages Votes for Nigeria Votes for Cameroon 
Bota 356 40 
Batoke 279 121 
Bakingili 109 45 
Bamuso 310 10 
Bova 656 17 
Small Soppo 299 86 
Great Soppo 453 150 
Membea 655 11 
Bonjongo 960 69 
Bonabavio 165 09 
Wokova 243 10 
Ekona Lelu 163 01 
Lysoka Natives 483 63 
Molyko 2 276 71 
Muea 2 299 147 
Total 5706 840 
Source: Cameroons Champion, vol.2, no.7 February 15, 1961, p.3 
 
 In seven villages of the division predominantly inhabited by non-Bakweri, a total 
of 11,185 votes were cast, 3,846 for Nigeria and 7,339 for Cameroon. In nine plantation 
polling stations, a total of 11,280 votes were cast at the plebiscite, 1,885 for Nigeria and 
9,392 for Camerooni. The Bakweri like other indigenes of the coast therefore concluded 
that they were solidly against reunification while settlers and plantation workers from 
the Bamenda Grassfields were for reunification. French Cameroon immigrants in all the 
divisions of the Southern Cameroons also inflated the votes in favour of reunification 
(Nfi, 2014). Was it therefore, proper to impose reunification on these coastal ethnic 
groups? Had they the right to self-determination? It was in attempt to answer these 
questions that the ethnic groups along the coast refused to accept the plebiscite results 
and petitioned the United Nations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
i
 Cameroons Champion, 15 February 1961, p.3 
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4. Requests for the Partition of the Southern Cameroons 
 
The publication of the plebiscite results on February 14, 1961 was followed by an 
avalanche of petitions from the CPNC and pro-CPNC ethic groups along the coast. 
Since the UN had not defined the details on how the results were to be interpreted, the 
CPNC petitions proposed that in the interpretation of the results only the ethnic groups 
or Kingdoms should be consulted rather than the nation Southern Cameroons created 
by the colonial masters. The CPNC position was stated in these words: 
 
 In our opinion, the tribe or clan constituted that unit, and it must be that unit that the 
 UN was to use in the final interpretation of the results. If any tribe indicated by majority 
 where it wished to be, there it was to be allowed to go. If the effect of that choice was to 
 last a thousand years, then that ethnic group would have chosen its destiny by itself.  
(Mbile, 2000:156) 
 
 With this stance, Endeley encouraged the ethnic groups that had voted for 
Nigeria to organise protests or petition the UN and clamour for the partition of the 
Southern Cameroons so that such ethnic groups could freely join Nigeria. The first 
group to call for a rebellion was the Bakweri Molongo-a cultural society embracing all 
the Bakweri speaking people. In a protest message published in Cameroon Champion of 
February 17, 1961, Chief K Lyonga of Soppo Wovila-President of Bakweri Molongo 
called for a Bakweri uprising in the following words:  
 
 “I wish to praise and congratulate all Bakweri at home and at work for the way they 
 voted during the last plebiscite of the Southern Cameroons. Their votes clearly indicated 
 that they do not like unification. The votes of strangers in our division cannot bind us to 
 a cause we do not accept. At a time like this, it is imperative for all Bakweri to stand firm, 
 myself as president of the Bakweri Molongo and the Bakweri Assembly men are prepared 
 to provide the dynamic leadership necessary to thwart domination from strangers on our 
 land. I call on all Bakweri therefore to provide the militant followership necessary for a 
 successful defiance against domination from other tribes.”ii 
 
  In the same edition of the newspaper, the publisher and CPNC propagandist, 
Peter Motomby-Woleta asked Foncha the following question; "if Ibo domination is not 
good for Cameroonians, should Grassfields domination be good for the Bakweri"? Foncha 
throughout the plebiscite campaigns had rejected union with Nigeria because he feared 
                                                          
ii
 Cameroons Champion, 17 February, 1961, p,2. 
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Ibo domination given that the Ibo were controlling more than 70 percent of the 
economy and 60 percent of the public service of the Southern Cameroons (Nfi, 2015). 
This is how he framed the plebiscite alternatives in the majority of the areas, "Do you like 
to stay in your country, the Cameroons?” Or "Do you wish to sell your country to the Ibo who 
will dethrone your chiefs and take away all your land and property" (Ngoh, 1987:233)? 
Motomby-Woleta's question clearly indicated that the Bakweri were resisting 
reunification because they feared Grassfields domination just like Foncha had rejected 
Nigeria out of fear of Igbo domination.  
 In a petition to the UN on Fabruary 17, 1961, the Bakweri Assembly indicated 
that they had voted for union with Nigeria because "native strangers" had developed a 
"plot" to "deprive" them of their "land. According to the petitioners, "native strangers" 
voted for reunification in Victoria Division in order to seize the Bakweri land, and in 
order “to spite and over-run the Bakweri".iii With these ambitions of the settlers, it was 
necessary for the Bakweri to remain in Nigeria. The UN was therefore invited to 
partition Southern Cameroons and allow the "Bamenda" people to go on with their 
Cameroon proposition. 
 On February 27, 1961, the Balondo of Kumba Division also complained in a 
petition to the UN that the "sinister motive" of the Grassfields people in voting for 
reunification was to "drag" the coastal peoples "to a lawless society" where they would 
then "seize" the Balondos "fertile lands" which they envied.iv In an interview granted to 
Cameroons Champion on March 11, 1961, Mbile declared that Foncha's ambition was to 
"extend the Bamita Empire to the Congo and Lake Chad". In order to be out of the 
Grassfields dominated "Bamita Empire", they called for the immediate partition of the 
Southern Cameroons between those who voted for Nigeria and those who voted for 
Cameroon. According to Mbile and Nasako who led the petitioners, the Balondo had 
registered a decisive majority in favour of union with Nigeria and could not accept 
Grassfields domination. 
 The next ethnic group in Kumba Division to complain was the Bakundu. In 
February 1961, the Bakundu People Convention informed the UN that they never voted 
for reunification and that they were prepared to fight against it to the last man if justice 
was not done by partitioning Cameroon. On March 4, 1961, the union of all the Bakossi 
speaking people, Mwane-Ngoe Union, organised a general assembly at Muambong. The 
close to 2,000 delegates from all the fifteen clans of the Bakossi and Bassosi groups 
called on the UN "to make all appropriate arrangements whereby the Bakossi people would be 
administered with other kindred tribes, who have voted solidly for federation with the 
                                                          
iii
 United Nations, Trusteeship Council, T/PET, 4/L, 21 March, 1961, pp.1-3. 
iv
 United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Petition from the Balondo Speaking People's Convention Concerning the 
Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Kumba, 27 February, 1961, pp.1-4. 
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independent Federation of Nigeria".v Like the Bakweri and the other ethnic groups in the 
Victoria and Kumba Divisions along the coast, the Bakossi feared the expropriation of 
their land by settlers and land grabbers from the Grassfields. 
 The Bafaw also joined the anti-reunification movement. On March 21, 1961, the 
Bafaw Youth Association wrote a petition to the UN complaining that Foncha's 
campaign slogans misled the electorate and that they were not for reunification. 
According to the Bafaw petitioners “those who voted for reunification did so because 
Foncha's slogans emphasized on the need to free Cameroon from the Ibo and not because they 
wanted reunification" (Chem-Langhëë, 332). The Bafaw petitioners did not raise fears of 
settler seizure of their land or Grassfields domination. 
 Besides, it should be made clear that the anti-reunification petitions were not 
limited to the coastal communities For example, the Fon of Nso in the Grassfields 
refused to recognise the plebiscite results in his kingdom in a petition to the UN on 
March 3, 1961. As a CPNC militant, he advocated union with Nigeria but his subjects 
opted for reunification. In his petition, he proposed that his kingdom be integrated in 
Northern Nigeria in case of the partition of the Southern Cameroons. Some petitioners 
from Nkambe Division also requested that their constituency be annexed to Northern 
Nigeria. 
 Again, not all the ethnic groups along the coast were against the plebiscite 
results. The Mbonge ethnic group through their chiefs wrote to the UN on March 20, 
1961 solemnly and solidly declaring their support for reunification. It should be recalled 
that Mbonge was the only electoral district in Kumba South East which voted with an 
overwhelming majority (12,827 votes against 6,105) in favour of the Cameroon 
proposition. Some of the Bakweri people were happy losers. Eleven Bakweri chiefs and 
thirteen Bakweri elders denounced the proposed partition of the Southern Cameroon 
and Dr Endeley for advocating such a hideous idea (Chem-Langhëë, 332). They were 
prepared to oppose the balkanisation of the already balkanised Cameroon. In Kumba, 
M Bokwe also stood tall against the meetings and resolutions in favour of partition. 
Mamfe which was geographically closer to Nigeria than Kumba or Victoria and where 
the electorate opted for reunification did not register any petition in favour of partition. 
It was perhaps the presence of people like Bokwe, the pro-reunification Bakweri chiefs 
and elders and the situation in Mbonge and Mamfe that made the post plebiscite ethnic 
tension and requests for the partition of the Southern Cameroons to end in threats not 
war. 
 
 
                                                          
v
 Cameroons Champion, 11 March 1961, p.1 
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5. Reactions from the UN and the Republic of Cameroon 
 
Endeley and the opponents of reunification along the coast did not end at the level of 
written threats and petitions. An important delegation of the CPNC and representatives 
of the various petitioning ethnic groups was sent to the UN in April 1961. While the 
CPNC paid travel and lodging expenses for Endeley and Mbile, the Bakweri Molongo, 
the Bakossi Muane-Ngoe and other ethnic associations paid the cost of sending their 
delegates (Mbile, 157). Finally, a CPNC team composed of E M L Endeley, N N Mbile, S 
M L Endeley, E K Martins, chief Sakwe-Bokwe and Rev. Andoh Seh arrived in New 
York in April 1961. The mission of the delegation was to convince the UN on the need 
for the ethnic groups that voted to join Nigeria to be given the chance to join Nigeria. 
The delegates addressed the UN in turns presenting various and varying arguments in 
favour of the partition of the territory. 
 After several presentations, the validation of the Southern Cameroons plebiscite 
results was put to vote. Before the voting proper, Charles Okala, the Foreign Affairs 
Minister of the Republic of Cameroon invited all the Francophone countries at the UN 
to boycott the session because he feared that the UN resolution to put the matter to vote 
was another British attempt to rob Cameroon of part of its land. Despite the absence of 
the Francophone states, the plebiscite results in the Southern Cameroons were declared 
valid by a UN vote of 26 for and 6 against with 33 abstentions (Mbile, 157). 
 The UN validation of the plebiscite results and rejection of appeals for the 
partition of Cameroon were not immediately considered as the end of the struggle by 
the CPNC and affiliated ethnic groups. It took quite some time for some "wise men" at 
the UN to change the hearts of the delegates along the corridors of the UN. Amongst 
these "wise men" was Dr Bebey Eyidi from the Republic of Cameroon. He in a very 
conciliatory voice appealed to the delegates to avoid the further fragmentation of 
Cameroon and to accept reunification as all may not be "fire-eating east of the river 
Mungo". With this, the CPNC delegates and the representatives of the petitioning ethnic 
groups accepted to meet Foncha and S T Muna in one of the UN halls. At the meeting, 
the petitioners accepted to abandon the struggle for the partition of the territory and to 
work with the KNDP for a smooth or hitch-free reunification. 
 After the entente between the Southern Cameroonians at the UN in April, 1961, 
Ahidjo, the President of the Republic of Cameroon decided to visit Buea in May 1961 so 
as to ensure that the threats of secession were over. During the visit, Ahidjo sprang all a 
huge surprise by inviting Endeley, Mbile, Motomby-Woleta and other CPNC militants 
known for their pro-Nigerian stance, to the Schloss (Prime Minister's residence) in Buea. 
He assured them that despite their views, he harboured no bitterness against them and 
that the task of nation building which lay ahead, was the concern of all Cameroonians 
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(Mbile, 159). This was clever on the part of Ahidjo who appeared to have known that 
these Foncha's opponents could be used in future to weaken Foncha's position in the 
new state. The rapprochement between Ahidjo and the CPNC made the dreaded 
reunification more and more acceptable to the Bakweri, Bkundu, Balondo, Bakossi and 
Bafaw ethnic groups which had vowed to fight it to the last man. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The post plebiscite political situation in the Southern Cameroons was very tense. 
Although the plebiscite results were challenged in almost all the constituencies, the 
coastal Bakweri, Bakossi, Bakundu and Balondo ethnic groups were more vocal and 
rebellious in their refusal to recognise the results. Using the CPNC propaganda paper, 
Cameroons Champion, the leaders of these groups published anti-Foncha and anti-
reunification literature threatening to fight to the last man to secure the partition of the 
Southern Cameroon. They feared that reunification was to lead to the seizure of their 
land by Grassfields settlers and the establishment by Foncha of a Grassfields dominated 
"Bamita Empire" 
 These threats remained on paper and the Southern Cameroons escaped partition 
probably because the Mamfe and Mbonge people and some Bakweri chiefs were against 
partition. However if the Southern Cameroons was not partitioned as requested by the 
pro-Nigerian ethnic groups, it was largely because the UN validated the plebiscite 
results to the chagrin of the petitioners and also because Ahidjo resolved to build the 
new nation even with those who had opposed reunification. The Bakweri, Bakossi, 
Balondo and Bakundu ethnic groups therefore remained within the reunited Cameroon 
much against the choice they made in February 1961 because of UN's validation of the 
plebiscite results and Ahidjo's determination to work with all West Cameroonians. This 
conclusion undermines previous findings by Willard Johnson and others which 
indicated that the opponents of reunification in the Southern Cameroons based their 
arguments on the fact that it was unwise to abandon the British system for the French 
culture in a turbulent and "terrorist" threatened French Cameroon. This paper enriches 
the empirical literature on the attitude of the ethnic groups towards reunification of 
with French Cameroon.  
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